Uav video downlink6/18/2023 At the same time, computer and network data gathering has become much cheaper and easier, so they have technical capabilities the Soviets could only dream of. Today’s insurgent adversaries don’t have KGB-level intelligence gathering or cryptanalytic capabilities. If you encrypt, they said, you have to do it “ right.” Even though that level of security makes no sense in Bosnia, and certainly not in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is what the NSA had to offer. During the Cold War, the NSA’s primary adversary was Soviet intelligence, and it developed its crypto solutions accordingly. Given this risk analysis, not encrypting the video is almost certainly the right decision. Without context, and just by peeking at random video streams, the risk caused by eavesdropping is low.Ĭontrast this with the additional risks if you encrypt: A soldier in the field doesn’t have access to the real-time video because of a key management failure a UAV can’t be quickly deployed to a new area because the keys aren’t in place we can’t share the video information with our allies because we can’t give them the keys most soldiers can’t use this technology because they don’t have the right clearances. This might make a great movie scene, but it’s not very realistic. Or notice a bunch of Marines walking through a recognizable area and attack them. Key management in this environment would be a nightmare.Īdditionally, how valuable is this video downlink is to the enemy? The primary fear seems to be that the militants watch the video, notice their compound being surveilled and flee before the missiles hit. It needs to be available to all sorts of people, of varying nationalities and security clearances, on a variety of field terminals, in a variety of geographical areas, in all sorts of conditions-with everything constantly changing. military bases, where key management is simpler. UAVs are flown by airmen sitting at comfortable desks on U.S. The command and control channel is, and always has been, encrypted-because that’s both more important and easier to manage. And the equipment, both the Predators and the ground terminals, needs to be classified and controlled, and all the users need security clearance. These keys have to be produced, guarded, transported, used and then destroyed. Each UAV needs to share a key with the ground station. But encrypting the data is the easiest part key management is the hard part. Encryption is so easy that HDTVs do it-just a software routine and you’re done-and the Pentagon has known about this flaw since Bosnia in the 1990s. The naive reaction is to ridicule the military. The systems weren’t “hacked”-the insurgents can’t control them-but because the downlink is unencrypted, they can watch the same video stream as the coalition troops on the ground. Predators, other unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, and even piloted planes. ![]() The Wall Street Journal reported this week that Iraqi, and possibly also Afghan, militants are using commercial software to eavesdrop on U.S. Sometimes mediocre encryption is better than strong encryption, and sometimes no encryption is better still.
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